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NOTES AS SECURITIES UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF
1933 AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Recently, federal courts have been attempting to distinguish between
note instruments that are securities under the definitional sections of the
Securities Act of 19331 and the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 and
those which are not. Primarily because it has been easier to establish fraud
under the civil liability provisions of the Acts than under common law
theories of fraud,4 federal suits alleging fraud in note transactions have
1. Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1)(1970).
2. Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970).
3. The provisions under which civil fraud actions may be brought are section
12(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970); section. 17(a) of the 1933 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970); section 10(b) of the 1934. Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1970); and rule lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (1974), which elaborates on the meaning of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.
See note 5 infra.
4. There was a considerable body of authority to the effect that the common law
fraud requirements of reliance and scienter need not be proved in an action undcr
rule lOb-5 or sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts; rather, proof of the materiality of
the untrue statement subsumes these elements. See, e.g., 3 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGU-
LATION 1702-03, 1766 (2d ed. 1961) ; A. BROMBERG, SECurITIEs LAW: FRAUD - SEC
RULE lOb-5 § 8.4 (1968) ; Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There
a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 W. REs. L. REV. 367, 371 (1967) ; White v. Abrams,
495 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1974) ; Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 835 (8th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); In re Four Seasons Securities Laws Litigation,
370 F. Supp. 219, 236 (W.D. Okla. 1974). Other authorities, however, questioned
whether negligence alone would support a private civil action under section 10(b) or
rule lOb-5, or whether, instead, some type of scienter must be demonstrated. See, e.g.,
Comment, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1057, 1080-81 (1969); 82
HARV. L. REV. 938, 947-50 (1969); Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1361-62 (10th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975) ; Lamza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1306 (2d
Cir. 1973). The Supreme Court resolved this conflict of authority in Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976), holding that scienter is a necessary element
for a private cause of action for damages under section 10(b) or rule 10b-5. See
note 5 infra. An action under the securities Acts retains the advantage of not requiring
the proof of reliance necessary to support a common law action for fraud. See 3
Loss, supra at 1765.
There are other advantages to bringing suit under rule lOb-5: the class of
persons that may be sued is much broader than the class that may be sued at common
law, see Gottleib v. Sandia Am. Corp., 452 F.2d 510, 516 (3d Cir. 1971) ; a plaintiff
can obtain nationwide venue and service of process, see 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1970) ; 15
U.S.C. § 78aa (1970); and shareholder derivative suits may be brought without pro-
viding security for the expenses of the defendant; see Borak v. J.I. Case Co., 317
F.2d 838, 849 (7th Cir. 1963), aff'd on other grounds, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). See
Comment, The Status of the Promissory Note Under the Federal Securities Law,
1975 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 175, 177-78. See also Comment, Commercial Notes and Definition
of 'Security' Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Note Is a Note Is a Noter,
52 NEB. L. REv. 478, 503-11 (1973).
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proliferated. 5 A threshold question in these cases, however, is whether the
instrument involved is a security; unless it is, the Acts are inapplicable,
and there is no federal subject matter jurisdiction to determine liability.
The definitional section of the 1933 Act - section 2 - provides in
part :
When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise
requires -
(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock,
bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certi-
ficate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share,
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for
a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas or other mineral
rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as
a "security", or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary
or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
Section 3(a) (10) of the 1934 Act closely parallels this language, but ex-
cludes short-term instruments from the definition of a security.7 Part I of
5. A large proportion of cases under the securities Acts are brought pursuant
to SEC rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading, or,
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would'operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
While authorities had differed on the question whether scienter is a require-
ment for a private cause of action under rule lOb-5 or section 10(b) of the 1934 Act,
see note 4 supra, this issue was recently settled by the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976). A private action for civil damages was brought
under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 against the accounting firm which had audited a
brokerage firm that had perpetrated a fraudulent securities scheme over a twenty year
period. The plaintiff investors proceeded solely on a theory of negligent nonfeasance,
there being no allegation that Ernst & Ernst had engaged in fraud or intentional
misconduct. The Court engaged in a thorough review of the statute, its legislative
history, the relationship of section 10(b) to other civil remedies under the Acts,
and the limitation of the scope of rule lOb-S by the statutory language and his-
tory of section 10(b), concluding that some element of scienter is necessary to
support an action under section 10(b) or rule lob-5. The Ernst & Ernst holding
may substantially reduce the attractiveness of the securities Acts to parties alleging
fraud in note transactions:
6. 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1970).
7. The term "security" means any note . . . but shall not include currency
or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity
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this Comment includes an explanation and criticism of the methods that
have been used to construe the definitional sections of the 1933 and 1934
Acts; both the earlier approach of the courts, the literal method, and the
current approach, "context-over-text," are considered. Part I then sug-
gests an alternative method of construction, one which begins with the
premise that the definitional terms are inherently ambiguous, thus allow-
ing the courts to interpret words like "note" in light of the legislative
purpose. In Part II a method for identifying notes that are securities and
for screening out those which are not is developed from two Supreme Court
cases - SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.8 and United Housing Foundation, Inc.
v. Forman.9
I. METHODS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
In cases decided before 1971, courts generally held all note instruments
brought before them to be securities, finding the definitional language
security' means any note," plain and unambiguous.10  This literal ap-
at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace,
or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970) (emphasis added).
In Securities Act Release No. 4412, 26 Fed. Reg. 9158 (1961), the SEC
articulated four criteria which formerly were applied only to exempt short-term
"securities" from the registration requirements of section 3(a) (3) of the 1933 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (3) (1970), but which are now applied to aid in determining
those short-term notes exempt from the definition of security in section 3(a) (10) of
the 1934 Act. See Welch Foods, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., [1974-75 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f[ 94,806 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507
F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th
Cir. 1974); Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974); Zeller v.
Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973) ;
Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009(1972); Thorp Commercial Corp. v. Northgate Indus., Inc., [1974-75 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. J 94,929 (D. Minn. 1974). See also Comment, The
Commercial Paper Market and the Securities Acts, 39 U. CHi. L. REv. 362 (1971).
The proper method of screening a short-term note for purposes of section 3(a) (10)
of the 1934 Act is first to determine whether the note meets all of the technical criteria
found in the SEC Release. If it does, it is a short-term note under section 3(a) (10)
and therefore is not within the coverage of the 1934 Act. Even if it does not meet one
or more of the criteria, however, the note should then be screened to determine whether
it is a security under the test set forth in Part II of this Comment.
8. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
9. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
10. See, e.g., Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 878 (5th Cir. 1970); Llanos v.
United States, 206 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 923 (1954);
Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 452
F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971) ; Prentice v. Hsu, 280 F. Supp. 384, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ;
SEC v. Vanco, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 422, 423 (D.N.J. 1958), aff'd, 283 F.2d 304 (3d
Cir. 1960).
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proach" was expressed by the court in Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo,
Inc. :12
Upon turning to § 3(a) (10) of the 1934 Act, however, we find
that it provides, in urequivocal and all-embracive language, that "The
term 'security' means any note . . . ." This plain language, literally
read, clearly includes promissory notes of the type that are the subject
of the present suit.
Although no case using this literal approach offered any general defini-
tion, the courts apparently read the statutory term to mean the common
law note instrument, which is any written paper acknowledging a debt and
expressing the debtor's promise to pay.' 3 Typical of these cases is Prentice
v. Hsu,14 where cash was given by one individual to another with the bor-
rower's note taken in exchange. The purpose of the loan was to finance
the borrower's trips from the United States to Formosa and Japan, where
the borrower claimed to have cash and securities. Upon the borrower's
promised return to the United States with the cash and securities, he would
be obligated to invest in the lender's corporation. Although the instru-
ment given by the defendant fits the common law definition of note, it
probably is not within the "ordinary concept of a security" as envisioned
11. There are two general approaches used in construing a statute. If a court
finds a statute plain and unambiguous it must apply the statutory language literally
without further consideration of meaning or legislative intent. Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). See also 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATU-
TORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.04, at 54 (4th ed. 1973). On the other hand, if a court finds
the statute ambiguous, it may then look into prior and contemporaneous circumstances,
the harms intended to be remedied, and the legislative purpose. Hamilton v. Rathbone,
175 U.S. 414, 419 (1899). Sutherland suggests that modern courts no longer begin
their inquiries with the language of the statute but instead go directly to manifestations
of legislative intent in an effort to construe the statute. 2A SUTHERLAND § 46.07, at 65.
Other materials useful in interpreting a statute are drafts of the proposed bill, legis-
lative hearings, committee reports, debate on the bill, executive messages, speeches,
and other published remarks.
12. 321 F. Supp. 806, 808 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971).
In Movielab the plaintiff purchased film processing and optical businesses by giving
two long-term promissory notes in the amount of $5.25 million each, payable in equal
monthly installments over a period of twenty years, and a short-term note in the
amount of $4.2 million. The obvious purpose of the transaction was the acquisition of
defendant's businesses by plaintiff; that payment took the form of plaintiff's notes was
merely incidental. Defendant very likely did not want to run the risk of investing in
plaintiff's newly-acquired business and probably would have preferred payment in
cash, accepting the notes as a necessary accommodation. Nevertheless, the court's
literal approach converted the parties' financing arrangement into a sale of securities
subject to the broad protection of the federal statutes.
13. A number of cases have undertaken to define a note at common law. See, e.g.,
Kirkland v. Bailey, 115 Ga. App. 726, 728, 155 S.E.2d 701, 703 (1967) ("The word
'note' is defined as a written paper acknowledging a debt and promising payment.") ;
Bates-Crumley Chevrolet Co. v. Brown, 141 So. 436, 439 (La. 1932) ("[A] note is
a written engagement or promise to pay a certain sum of money at a time specified.
It is the evidence of an obligation to pay."); Almond v. Gilmer, 188 Va. 1, 20, 49
S.E.2d 431, 442 (1948) ("The common and accepted definition of a note is a written
acknowledgment of a debt and a promise to pay.").
14. 280 F. Supp. 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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by the legislative framers of the securities acts.15 Without analysis, the
court held that the note was a security: "That promissory notes are within
the intendment of the securities laws cannot be seriously questioned."' 16
Recent cases reject this literal approach. 17  The reason most fre-
quently given is that the introductory phrase "unless the context otherwise
requires" is an invitation to scrutinize the particular instrument involved
to see whether, in the context of the transaction, it should be regarded as
a security."' Under this method, if a court determines that a particular
15. The phrase "ordinary concept of a security" was coined in H.R. RaP. No. 85,
73d Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1933). It has become a general standard by which it is
determined whether a particular instrument is included in the definitional sections of
the Securities Acts. In Part II of this Comment, a method is developed that estab-
lishes with more specificity what kinds of notes come within the Acts.
Although experts in the securities field are not in total agreement, it appears
that as used technically in the industry the term "note" is not simply the common law
promissory note. The characteristics that distinguish the notes security from other
types of notes are that these notes are generally issued by corporations, governments
or other public bodies, S. KAMM, MAKING PROFITS IN THE STOCK MARKET 16, 18
(1961); H. SHERWOOD, HOW TO INVEST IN BONDS 24-25 (1974); see generally H.
SAUVAIN, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 15-16 (1967), are bought and sold on the open
market by the public, SHERWOOD, supra at 24-25; SAUVAIN, supra at 3, 15-16, and
are usually bought for the purpose of realizing pecuniary gain, generally in the
form of income, interest or capital gains, SAUVAIN, supra at 4, 8. By purchasing such
an instrument the buyer runs the risk of losing the principal. Id. at 6-7. Nevertheless,
many cases have held notes to be securities which were not in actuality of the type
ordinarily thought of as securities. See Llanos v. United States, 206 F.2d 852 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 923 (1953) (cash loans used for bets on "fixed" volley-
ball games were given to individuals in exchange for their notes); Lehigh Valley
Trust Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 409 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1969) (note given to a bank
in exchange for a loan). For a discussion of why a note given to a bank for a loan is
not a "security," see note 68 and accompanying text infra.
16. 280 F. Supp. at 386. The court relied on earlier cases similarly lacking in
analysis. See Llanos v. United States, 206 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 923 (1954) ; United States v. Monjar, 147 F.2d 916 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
325 U.S. 859 (1945); SEC v. Vanco, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 422 (D.N.J. 1958), aff'd,
283 F.2d 304 (3d Cir. 1960). For further criticism of this case see Comment, Com-
mercial Notes and Definition of a "Security" Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934:
A Note Is a Note Is A Note?, 52 NEB. L. REv. 478, 495-96 (1973).
17. See, e.g., C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975) ; McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d
490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975); Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank,
495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir.
1973); United States v. Koenig, 388 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Oxford Fin.
Cos. v. Harvey, 385 F. Supp. 431 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
18. See C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546
(10th Cir. 1974); Avenue State Bank v. Tourtelot, 379 F. Supp. 250 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
Several other bases have been suggested for rejecting literal construction of
the definitional sections. One reason for holding that a particular note is covered by
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note has not been acquired as a security, the note instrument can not pro-
vide a basis for federal jurisdiction under the securities Acts. The con-
text-over-text method of construction originated in Joseph v. Norman's
Health Club, Inc.,19 where the court held that two-year promissory notes
given by individuals in payment for health club memberships were not
securities.20 The Joseph court reasoned first that it must adopt a flexible
approach in order to cover the varied schemes of "those who seek the use
of the money of others on the promise of profit." 21 The court then con-
sidered the language opening both definitional sections - "When used in
this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires" - concluding that
the context of the transaction required that these promissory notes not be
treated as securities.2 2 Other courts have adopted the Joseph context-
over-text formulation and it is now the primary means through which
courts exclude certain notes from the scope of the securities Acts.2 3
The conclusion that the Acts should be used to protect only certain
note transactions is sound and is supported by the legislative history of the
the securities acts is that Congress intended the courts to construe the term broadly
and flexibly rather than restrictively. See, e.g., Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484
F.2d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 417 U.S. 506 (1974) ; Ingenito
v. Bermec Corp., 376 F. Supp. 1154, 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Davis v. Avco Corp.,
371 F. Supp. 782, 786 (N.D. Ohio 1974); SEC v. Thunderbird Valley, Inc., 356 F.
Supp. 184, 188 (D.S.D. 1973); cf. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
The continued vitality of this principle is in doubt. See note 43 infra. Another reason
occasionally cited is the principle that courts should look to the economic realities of
the transacton to determine whether the kind of instrument Congress intended to be
covered by the securities acts is involved. See Davis v. Avco Corp., 371 F. Supp. 782,
787 (N.D. Ohio 1974). For discussion of the present status of this principle see notes
34-36 and accompanying text infra. Finally, there are several cases in which courts
did not explain the method of statutory construction they were using but instead
merely stated that the purpose of the Acts was to protect investors, and whether a
note was a security depended on whether it had been "purchased as an investment."
See, e.g., McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 492-95 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975) ; Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109, 1111-16 (5th
Cir. 1974); Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 800 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 908 (1973); Barthe v. Rizzo, 384 F. Supp. 1063, 1067-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
These courts seem to have been relying upon legislative intent as gleaned from the
legislative history of the Acts.
19. 336 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
20. Id. at 313.
21. Id.
22. The court failed to articulate any standards for assessing transactions, merely
concluding that, in this transaction, the notes were not securities: "This Court is of
the opinion that the context of the present case . . .requires that the promissory note
is other than a security within the meaning of § 10b." Id.
23. See, e.g., C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975) ; Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546 (10th
Cir. 1974) ; Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973) ; Thorp Commer-
cial Corp. v. Northgate Indus., Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FEo. SEC. L.
REP. f" 94,929 (D. Minn. 1974); United States v. Koenig, 388 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) ; Oxford Fin. Cos. v. Harvey, 385 F. Supp. 431 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Avenue State
Bank v. Tourtelot, 379 F. Supp. 250 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
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Acts;24 however, the courts' notion that "context" means context of the
transaction seems flawed. The more proper construction appears to be
that "context" refers to the context of the statute. Thus, in SEC v. National
Securities, Inc.,25 the Supreme Court, in construing the "purchase or sale"
language of rule lOb-5, explained:
[O] rdinary rules of statutory construction still apply. The meaning of
particular phrases must be determined in context .... Congress itself
has cautioned that the same words may take on a different coloration
in different sections of the securities laws; both the 1933 and the 1934
Acts preface their lists of general definitions with the phrase "unless
the context otherwise requires.
26
Despite this authoritative interpretation, the lower federal courts have
continued to use "context" as an excuse for examining the transactions to
determine whether a "security" has been traded. Perhaps the motivation
for this has been a reluctance on the part of federal courts to make them-
selves available to any plaintiff who might have been defrauded in a trans-
action involving a common law note. Nevertheless, the interpretation does
violence to the statutory language; the construction set forth in National
Securities, in addition to being that offered by the Supreme Court, is more
reasonable and logical than that followed by the lower courts, and should
be adopted generally.
Such an adoption, however, will not by itself provide a basis for dis-
tinguishing between "note securities" and all other common law notes. The
context of none of the anti-fraud provisions of the securities Acts indicates
anything about the meaning of "note." Thus, despite the lower court
decisions, it appears that the language "unless the context otherwise re-
quires" does not answer the question whether some notes, i.e., note securi-
ties, are included under the scope of the Acts while others are not. The
proper focus in resolving this question must be on construing the word
''note" itself.
As used in the definitional sections, the word "note" is ambiguous
because it may refer either to the broad class of all common law notes or
to the narrower subclass of note securities. Because of this ambiguity,
further illumination on the intended meaning of the term must be sought.
In United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman2l the Supreme Court
was faced with a similar problem - how to construe the terms "stock....
investment contract . . . or, in general, any interest or instrument com-
monly known as a 'security,'" which also appear in the definitional sec-
tions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts as classes of securities. 28 United Housing
Foundation involved the purchase of shares of "stock" in a non-profit
housing cooperative in New York City. The purpose of the transaction
24. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933).
25. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
26. Id. at 466.
27. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
28. See notes 6-7 and accompanying text supra.
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was to entitle the buyers to occupy apartments in the low cost cooperative.
The Court held that these shares were not securities. At the outset, the
Court rejected the literal method of construing the definitional sections,
stating that the stock purchasers' reliance on SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
Corp.29 was misplaced. 30 In Joiner the statement had been made that
"[i]nstruments may be included within [the definition of a security], as
[a] matter of law, if on their face they answer to the name or description."3'
The Supreme Court called this Joiner statement dictum, adding that in
any case the use of the words "may" and "might" made it clear that the
Joiner Court was not establishing an inflexible rule; rather, it was merely
pointing out that in many instances instruments bearing one of the statu-
torily enumerated titles are likely to be included within the statutory
coverage. 32 The Court held that "the name given to an instrument was
not dispositive."' "3 Instead, it adopted as the appropriate method of con-
struction the "economic realities" approach34 first articulated in SEC v.
W.J. Howey Co.35 and later applied in Tcherepnin v. Knight.'6 Under this
approach a court focuses on the characteristics of the instrument and the
circumstances of the transaction in order to determine whether the trans-
action is of the kind intended by Congress to be controlled by the securi-
ties Acts.
Thus, in Howey the instruments involved were land sales contracts.
A large citrus grower sold small sections of its groves to mainly out-of-
state purchasers. Under the terms of a service contract usually accom-
panying the sale contracts, the land remained in the possession of the
grower whose size allowed for efficient agricultural operation. The buyers
typically were business and professional people seeking a promised high
return on invested capital. The Supreme Court had no difficulty conclud-
ing that the land sales contracts were "investment contracts" and thus
"securities" within the intendment of the Acts.' 7
[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means
a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money
in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the
efforts of the promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether
the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by
nominal interests in the physical assets employed in the enterprise.
The Court disregarded the "form" of the transaction (and the substantial
fact that the buyers received not only an instrument, but also land with at
29. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
30. 421 U.S. at 849-50.
31. Id. at 850, quoting from 320 U.S. at 351.
32. 421 U.S. at 848-51.
33. Id. at 850.
34. Id. See Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1
95,494, at 99,499 (9th Cir., Mar. 22, 1976).
35. 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
36. 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
37. 328 U.S. at 298-99.
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least some value independent of the common enterprise) and focused on
"whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common enter-
prise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others." 38
Again, in Tcherepnin v. Knight the Court looked to the economic
reality of the transaction, holding that "withdrawable capital shares" in a
savings and loan association were securities within the meaning of the 1934
Act.3 9 Applying this method to the "stock" involved in United Housing
Foundation, that Court reasoned :40
These shares have none of the characteristics "that in our com-
mercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security." Despite
their name, they lack what the Court in Tcherepnin deemed the most
common feature of stock: the right to receive "dividends contingent
upon an apportionment of profits." Nor do they possess the other
characteristics traditionally associated with stock: they are not negoti-
able; they cannot be pledged or hypothecated; they confer no voting
rights in proportion to the number of shares owned; and they cannot
appreciate in value. In short, the inducement to purchase was solely to
acquire subsidized low-cost living space; it was not to invest for profit.
It should be noted that the Court's rejection of the literal approach in
United Housing Foundation was not without qualification. In a somewhat
vaguely stated dictum, the Court suggested that justifiable reliance on
names will be protected :41
There may be occasions when the use of a traditional name such as
"stocks" or "bonds" will lead a purchaser justifiably to assume that
the federal securities laws apply. This would clearly be the case when
the underlying transaction embodies some of the significant character-
istics typically associated with the named instrument.
Thus the name given to an instrument and the significance attached to the
name by the parties to the transaction appear to be part of the "economic
realities" to be considered in determining whether the Acts apply.
The Court also ruled that the cooperative housing shares were neither
an "investment contract" nor other "interests or instrument commonly
known as a 'security.'" Again, the Court stressed that the "economic
realities" of the transaction would control. Here, however, the Court,
quoting from its earlier decision in Howey, formulated something of a
general rule to be used in assessing disputed transactions. 42
In either case, the basic test for distinguishing the [protected] trans-
action from other commercial dealings is "whether the scheme involves
an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come
solely from the efforts of others." This test, in shorthand form, em-
38. Id. at 301.
39. 389 U.S. at 338.
40. 421 U.S. at 851 (citations omitted).
41. Id. at 850-51.
42. Id. at 852.
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bodies the essential attributes that run through all of the Court's de-
cisions defining a security.
The method developed by the Supreme Court in Howey and Tcherepnin
and given broad application in United Housing Foundation offers a sen-
sible approach for determining whether a particular note transaction is
within the purview of the securities Acts.43 Part II of this Comment is an
attempt to develop this approach.
I. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
Recent lower court cases that have employed the context-over-text
approach 44 have not been entirely clear on what characteristics of the trans-
action are important in determining whether the instrument involved is a
note security within the securities Acts. Most courts agree that each
disputed transaction must be dealt with on the basis of its own probably
unique factual pattern. Nevertheless, because one of the purposes of the
43. The method of construction developed in United Housing Foundation will
probably modify a concept set forth in Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336,
338 (1967):
[W]e are guided by the familiar canon of statutory construction that remedial
legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes. The Securities
Exchange Act clearly falls into the category of remedial legislation ...
Even a casual reading of §3(a) (10) reveals that Congress did not intend to
adopt a narrow or restrictive concept of a security in defining that term.
Tcherepnin was cited frequently for the principle that courts are obliged to tip the
scales in favor of establishing jurisdiction over securities transactions, not narrowing
it. E.g., Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd on
other grounds, 417 U.S. 506 (1974); Ingenito v. Bermec Corp., 376 F. Supp. 1154,
1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ; Davis v. Avco Corp., 371 F. Supp. 782, 786 (N.D. Ohio 1974) ;
SEC v. Thunderbird Valley, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 184, 188 (D.S.D. 1973). After United
Housing Foundation, however, federal courts should not simply state that Tcherepnin
requires a broad, liberal construction of the definitional sections and then hold, without
further reasoning or explanation, that the notes before them are securities. United
Housing Foundation now requires that a court look at the characteristics of the
instrument and the circumstances of the transaction to determine whether the in-
strument is of a type ordinarily thought to be a security. A concomitant effect of
the principle that the definitional sections are to be construed broadly has been a
narrow construction of the exemption in section 3(a) (10) of the 1934 Act, see note 7
supra, for short-term notes having a maturity of nine months or less. See, e.g.,
Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546, 550 (10th Cir. 1974) ; SEC v. Continental Commodi-
ties Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 524 (5th Cir. 1974) ; Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476
F.2d 795, 799-800 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973); Sanders v. John
Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 1079-80 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972) ;
Thorp Commercial Corp. v. Northgate Indus., Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f" 94,929 (D. Minn. 1974); Welch Foods, Inc. v. Goldman,
Sachs & Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 94,806 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); Crowell v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R., 373 F. Supp. 1303, 1307-08 (E.D.
Pa. 1974).
44. See notes 17-23 and accompanying text supra.
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securities Acts is to protect investors,4" many courts have indicated that
the basic inquiry is whether the note transaction constitutes an invest-
ment or is merely "commercial," 4 although the limited meaning attached
to this latter term is never made clear in the cases. The various factors
that have appeared in disputed note transactions are then assessed for their
classificatory value under this investment/commercial test.47
There are several difficulties with this approach. First, the classi-
ficatory value of these factors will not remain constant from transaction
to transaction, but will vary somewhat depending on the other factors
present. 48 Thus, as an analytical tool the investment/commercial dichotomy
has only limited value. 49 More seriously, the basic inquiry seems flawed.
Implicit in the dichotomy is the false assumption that any note that is
not an investment is necessarily a commercial note; a personal I.O.U.,
for example, would seem not to fit in either category. 50 Also implicit is
45. There is considerable language in the legislative history of the Acts indicat-
ing Congress' concern with fraud and misrepresentation practiced on investors. See,
e.g., S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 18 (1934); S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess. 1 (1933) ("The purpose of this bill is to protect the investing public ....
The basic policy is that of informing the investor of the facts concerning securities ...
and providing protection against fraud and misrepresentation.") ; H.R. REP. No. 1383,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934). See also United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,
421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975) ; 78 CONG. REC. 2264 (1934) (President Roosevelt's February
9, 1934, message to Congress); 77 CONG. REC. 937 (1933) (President Roosevelt's
March 29, 1933, message to Congress).
46. See, e.g., C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975) ; Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546 (10th
Cir. 1974) ; McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 930 (1975) ; United States v. Koenig, 388 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) ;
Oxford Fin. Cos. v. Harvey, 385 F. Supp. 431 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Davis v. Avco Corp.,
371 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Thorp Commercial Corp. v. Northgate Indus.,
Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff 92,929 (D. Minn. 1974).
Other cases have expressed concern only with the investment nature of the transaction,
not with its commercial nature. See, e.g., Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d
611 (7th Cir. 1973), rezld on other grounds, 417 U.S. 506 (1974) ; Barthe v. Rizzo,
384 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Hall v. Security Planning Serv., Inc., 371 F.
Supp. 7 (D. Ariz. 1974).
47. See Comment, Commercial Notes and Definition of 'Security' Under Securities
Exchange Act of 1934: A Note Is a Note Is a Note?, 52 NEB. L. REv. 478, 510-
23 (1973).
48. Thus, investor naivete may be important in some cases, see, e.g., Davis v.
Avco Corp., 371 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ohio 1974), but unimportant in others, for
example, where the investor is active in the management of the enterprise, see, e.g.,
C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); Oxford Fin. Cos. v. Harvey, 385 F. Supp. 431 (E.D.
Pa. 1974).
49. See, e.g., McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 492-95 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975); United States v. Koenig, 388 F. Supp. 670, 714
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Oxford Fin. Cos. v. Harvey, 385 F. Supp. 431, 435 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
50. Courts using the term "commercial" have failed to explain its meaning, and
the word does not have a well-established usage in the securities field. Both Congress
and the Supreme Court have indicated that securities sometimes are issued in com-
1976]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
the notion that any note transaction that can be characterized as an in-
vestment comes within the purview of the Acts. But investment is not
a term of art; it has application to a wide variety of personal and com-
mercial situations, only some of which seem appropriately protected by
the Acts. Further refinement of the terminology seems necessary, yet the
cases employing the investment/commercial test offer little assistance.
The Supreme Court's statement in United Housing Foundation that
the Howey test "embodies the essential attributes that run through all of
the Court's decisions defining a security" 5' suggests that this test should
help in the difficult process of determining whether a note is a security.
The test consists of four elements. There must be 1) an investment of
money 2) in a common enterprise 3) with an expectation of profits 4) to
be derived solely from the efforts of others.
The first element, investment of money, suffers from the same lack of
refinement of language apparent in the investment/commercial test. If in-
vestment is taken to be a term of art, however, its utility is greatly increased.
Experts in the securities field define "securities" partly in terms of
risk of loss. 2 This concept was first considered by the legal community in
Silver Hills Country Club v. Sdbieski.53 The California Supreme Court
there announced its determination that "risk capital" was an important
means of defining the term security.5 4 Professor Coffey later expanded
this concept, establishing it as his major premise:
[R]isk to initial investment, though not determinative, is the single
most important economic characteristic which distinguishes a security
from the universe of other transactions. 55
Risk of loss is an important concept because it isolates and emphasizes
the major danger to an investor - the possibility of losing all the money
mercial settings, thus making those security instruments "commercial." See, e.g., H.R.
REG. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933) ("Paragraph (1) defines the term
'security' in sufficiently broad and general terms so as to include within that definition
the many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary
concept of a security."); United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,
852 (1975) ("[T]he basic test for distinguishing the [protected] transaction from
other commercial dealings is [the Howey test].")
Some focus on the "investment" nature of a transaction seems appropriate,
however, in light of the well-established usage of that term in the legislative history
of the securities Acts and investment contract cases. See note 45 supra.
51. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
52. See SAUVAIN, supra note 15, at 6-7.
53. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906 (1961).
54. Id. at 814, 361 P.2d at 907. In Silver Hills the court held that purchases of
memberships in a seriously under-capitalized country club constituted purchases of
securities under CAL. CoRp. CODE § 25019 (West 1971).
55. Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There A More Mean-
ingful Formula?, 18 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 367, 375, 381 (1967). Professor Coffey
identifies the source of the risk of loss requirement as SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943). See also Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, CCH
FED. SEC. L. REc. 1 95,494, at 99, 499-500 (9th Cir., Mar. 22, 1976).
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or other property contributed to an enterprise. In passing the 1933 and
1934 Acts, Congress was concerned primarily with protecting the invest-
ing public.56 If an investor incurs no risk of loss, then there is no need
for the protection offered by the securities Acts.
One way in which capital is subjected to substantial risk of loss is
through contribution to a young, unproven enterprise. Even if all the cir-
cumstances known (e.g., officers in the corporation, marketability of the
product, feasibility of the operations) point to the likelihood of a successful
venture, there remains the possibility that unforeseen circumstances will
quickly reduce the assets of the business, leaving insufficient funds to
repay a note creditor. A recent district court case illustrates the substantial
risk of loss inherent in a contribution to a new corporation. In Barthe v.
RiZZo 57 the plaintiff was the payee on a $93,000 note. The payor was a
newly-formed corporation which intended to use the contributed funds as
venture capital. Barthe had been induced to contribute to this corporation
by the defendant who, for many years, had been retained by Barthe to
invest Barthe's money in securities of defendant's choosing. Defendant
eventually formed a plan to defraud plaintiff. Pursuant to this plan, he
advised plaintiff to take the new corporation's note for $93,000, payable
at an interest rate of seven percent, while unbeknownst to plaintiff, de-
fendant passed off the contribution of $93,000 as his own. The court found
that "the loan was meant to be seed money for a venture capital deal ....
Under these circumstances, the note falls squarely under the protective
umbrella of the securities laws."58
56. See note 45 supra.
57. 384 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
58. Id. at 1068. Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974), presents a
situation analogous to Barthe. In Zabriskie an unsophisticated individual was per-
suaded to loan sums of money to a closely-held corporation so that it could be "pro-
moted." It is difficult to discern whether the court was describing the promotion of a
newly-formed or a mature corporation. The court characterized this transaction as the
kind in which stock often is given. Id. at 551, citing Comment, Commercial Notes
and Definition of 'Security' Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Note Is a
Note Is a Note?, 52 NEB. L. Rxv. 478, 501 (1973). This formulation suggests a new
perspective from which to analyze Barthe. The plaintiff in Barthe supplied all of the
corporation's cash funds but received only four and a half percent of its stock, with
the remainder of his investment represented by a note. Because the plaintiff was
the source of the entire corporate treasury, he stood at the "front lines of risk" as
a participant in the enterprise. There was no common stock which provided an equity
fund to serve as a buffer for the note creditor. The capital furnished by the note payee
therefore functioned in a manner similar to common stock. Professor Coffey has
developed the concept of "front lines of risk." See Coffey, supra note 4, at 386. He
distinguishes debt securities from others because they are generally far removed from
the front lines of risk - junior investments, usually common stock, cushion the
creditor against corporate losses. The logical extension of this concept is that when a
debt security provides all of a corporation's treasury, it functions much like common
stock and should be regarded as a security so long as other characteristics of a security
are present.
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Capital is also placed at substantial risk when it is contributed in an
attempt to resuscitate an unsuccessful enterprise. If the. enterprise con-
tinues to operate at a loss, then the chance of recouping contributed capital
becomes increasingly small. SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp.59
introduced the concept that the resuscitative nature of a note was a mean-
ingful indication that it was a security. The SEC sued to enjoin the de-
fendant from violating registration and fraud provisions of the 1933 and
1934 Acts. The nature of defendant's business was to acquire commodities
futures options for its customers and then advise them as to the most
propitious time to sell the futures contracts. The customers deposited sums
of money in "accounts" with defendant to cover forthcoming acquisitions
and services. Defendant had misrepresented its solvency and the lucrative-
ness of trading in future and the SEC therefore suspended its trading in-
definitely. Defendant then offered to pay its customers sixty percent of
the money owed them immediately, and to issue notes to the customers
for the remaining forty percent. In return for the notes, the customers
agreed to forbear from bringing suit.60 These notes were one basis for
jurisdiction alleged by the SEC in its suit against defendant.6 l The Fifth
Circuit held that the notes were securities, and were therefore a basis for
jurisdiction, because the resuscitative nature of the contribution established
that the notes had been acquired as invesments: "Since revival would inure
to their benefit, recipients accepted the notes with the hope of realizing a
greater return on their investments. '62 Thus, there were two important
reasons for concluding the notes were securities. The note payees were
willing to risk the money that they might otherwise have received as dam-
ages in an action to liquidate, and they did so in hopes of receiving a
greater sum if they forebore from bringing suit and permitted defendant to
continue its operation.
A third situation the presence of which may indicate substantial risk
to contributed capital is inadequate collateralization. Looking to the two
extremes possible with regard to collateralization, the governing principle
becomes apparent. On the one hand, collateral that is many times more
valuable than the face amount of the note and that is not susceptible to
market fluctuation would tend to make the transaction risk-free and there-
59. 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974).
60. The question arises whether forbearance can constitute a contribution.
Professor Coffey explains that the value furnished by an investor can take a variety
of forms; for example, money, property or services. See Coffey, supra note 4, at 380.
Forbearance from bringing a liquidation action seems in the same category as the
forms listed by Coffey. The value risked by the contributor is that amount which
could have been recovered in an action to dissolve the corporation and liquidate its
assets. Similarly, the corporation received a contribution in that the forbearance left
it with some operating capital.
61. 497 F.2d at 519. The other basis of jurisdiction alleged was that the trading
accounts themselves were investment contracts. The court concluded that either alle-
gation satisfied the jurisdictional requirement of a "security."
62. Id. at 527.
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fore not a Security transaction within the securities Acts. On the other
hand, with a note secured by no collateral the risk of loss would be substan-
tial. Degrees of collateralization between these two extremes are possible
and there is no precise point at which to conclude unequivocally that the
note becomes risk-free. This is a decision for the finder of fact, and several
factors should be considered in light of the purposes of the securities Acts,
including the value of the collateral in relation to the face amount of the
note, the form of the collateral, and its susceptibility to market fluctuations.
One court recently has suggested that collateralization is a factor to
consider in determining whether a note is a security.63 Indeed, most cases
in which notes were collateralized have held that the notes in issue were
not securities. 64 It is probable that the existence of collateral contributed
to these decisions. Forms of collateral used in these cases included deeds
of trust on real property,65 chattel mortgages on the fixtures of a business, 66
and the accounts receivable of a business. 67 Real property and fixtures
tend to be less susceptible to market fluctuations than do notes, making
the transactions involved relatively risk-free. The lenders in most of these
collateralization cases were banks or other lending institutions. Such so-
phisticated entities normally will ensure that there is an appropriate corre-
lation between the value of the collateral and the face amount of the note."8
63. In Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 11 95,494,
at 99,500 (9th Cir., Mar. 22, 1976), the Ninth Circuit identified the "existence and
extent of collateralization" as an important factor in determining whether a corporate
note given to a bank in exchange for a line of credit was a security. The court held
that the note given to the bank in a commercial financing transaction was not a
security, in part because the loan agreement required the corporate note ;ssuer to
maintain a sizeable account with the bank as partial security. Id. at 99,501. See also
El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224, 1230 n.14 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 900 (1974).
64. See, e.g., C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975) ; McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d
490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975) ; Thorp Commercial Corp. v.
Northgate Indus., Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 94,929
(D. Minn. 1974) ; Avenue State Bank v. Tourtelot, 379 F. Supp. 250 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
A few courts have held that notes were securities despite the fact that they
were collateralized. See Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974) ; Zeller v.
Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973) ;
SEC v. Thunderbird Valley, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 184 (S.D.S.D. 1973). In Zabriskie
it appeared that the collateral given was worth very little in comparison to the amount
loaned. In Zeller and Thunderbird Valley it is unclear what the relationship was
between the value of the collateral and the value of the note.
65. McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 930 (1975) ; Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974).
66. C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975).
67. Avenue State Bank v. Tourtelot, 379 F. Supp. 250 (N.D. Ill. 1974) ; Thorp
Commercial Corp. v. Northgate Indus., Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 94,929 (D. Minn. 1974).
68. Banks and other lending institutions that invest their depositors' funds in a
fiduciary capacity and are required to invest prudently. See generally Note, Thc Regu-
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In the cases involving accounts receivable, for example, it appeared that
there was a substantial margin between the value of the accounts and the
value of the notes. 69
The second element in the Howey test is the requirement that the in-
vestment be in a common enterprise. Judicial discussion of the nature of
a common enterprise thus far has been confined to investment contract
cases, where two schools of thought regarding the definition of "common
enterprise" have developed. The conservative view, espoused by the
Seventh Circuit in Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 70 is that there must
be a pooling of funds, through contribution by a number of contributors to
a common promoter, with a pro-rata sharing of profits.71 The Fifth and
Ninth Circuits, on the other hand, do not regard a common enterprise as
requiring a pooling of funds or pro-rata sharing of profits, but insist only
that "the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and dependent upon
the efforts and success of those seeking the investment or of third parties.17 2
In Rochkind v. Reynolds Securities, Inc. 73 a federal district court apply-
ing the more liberal formulation included as a common enterprise a situa-
tion in which a single contributor relied on the efforts of a promoter. 74 The
underlying dissimilarity between the two schools appears to be in the
differing weights assigned to the competing principles involved. The
liberal school appears to favor the principle embodied in the securities
Acts of providing liberal federal relief to victims of investment frauds ;75
the conservative school appears to favor the competing principle of federal
judicial economy, thus denying relief where merely private fraud is involved.
Whichever approach is adopted, it seems necessary to examine both
the issuing entity and the recipient in a note transaction. For a note to
be a security the issuing entity generally should be a business enterprise
or governmental body. This conclusion follows from the propositions that
lation of Risky Investments, 83 HARv. L. REV. 603, 608-16 (1970); 12 C.F.R. §§
1.1-.12 (1974). Therefore, they are under a duty to invest in enterprises which have
proven or are likely to prove successful. Presumably, they must also secure loans with
a safe margin between the value of the collateral and the face amount of the note. For
a discussion of the impropriety of classifying as securities notes from borrowers held
by commercial banks, see Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, CCH FED. SEc. L.
REP. ff 95,494, at 99,502-04 (9th Cir., Mar. 22, 1976) (Wright, J., concurring).
69. See, e.g., Avenue State Bank v. Tourtelot, 379 F. Supp. 250 (N.D. Ill. 1974),
where a note for $220,000 was secured by accounts receivable valued at over $500,000.
70. 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972); see Wasnowic v.
Chicago Bd. of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa. 1972), af'd, 491 F.2d 752 (3d
Cir. 1973).
71. 457 F.2d at 278.
72. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478 (5th Cir. 1974), quoting
from SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); see SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497
F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1975).
73. 388 F. Supp. 254 (D. Md. 1975).
74. Id. at 257.
75. See note 45 supra.
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the term "note" appearing in each of the definitional sections refers only
to those notes commonly regarded as securities in the commercial world,76
and that in the commercial world the only type of instruments commonly
regarded as securities are those issued by business enterprises and govern-
mental bodies.77 The entities included within this approach are diverse:
corporations, partnerships, and less formal associations of individuals acting
together for a business purpose are all "business enterprises."
Notes of individuals ordinarily should not be regarded as securities,
particularly when they are not given in pursuit of a business objective. 78
Several courts have characterized notes given by individuals in payment
for consumer goods as the kind of notes that are not securities. 79 To these
should be added notes given as payment for other kinds of goods, rights,
and services, and notes given in exchange for loans of money for personal
76. See United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851 (1975).
77. See note 15 supra.
78. In only two recent cases have courts held that the notes of individuals were
securities under the Act, and both courts reached that decision through faulty analysis.
See Ingenito v. Bermec Corp., 376 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Davis v. Avco
Corp., 371 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ohio 1974). The plaintiffs in Davis were victims of the
pyramid scheme Dare To Be Great. For a detailed description of the Dare To Be
Great system, see SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 479-80
(9th Cir. 1973), and Note, Dare To Be Great, Inc.!: A Case Study of Pyramid Sales
Plan Regulation, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 676, 677-86 (1972). The Dare To Be Great system
sought persons who would purchase the right to attend classes and obtain other in-
structional materials on how to be successful in business. This opportunity usually
was purchased for about $1000, with more expensive opportunities, consisting of
privileges to sell the scheme to others, available for multiples of the basic price. The
defendant in Davis was a finance company that operated in conjunction with Glenn
Turner Enterprises, the Dare To Be Great corporation. The defendant made repre-
sentations to the plaintiffs that Dare To Be Great was a sound investment. On these
facts, the court concluded that the promissory notes issued by the plaintiffs in payment
for Dare To Be Great opportunities were securities. 371 F. Supp. at 788.
The court stated that the basis of its holding was that the plaintiffs were un-
sophisticated investors (in Dare To Be Great). Id. at 787-88. However, the court's
reasoning was faulty. For the notes to constitute securities, Avco, the note recipient,
would have had to be the investor. By the court's own declaration, plaintiffs were
the investors. Id. If the interests purchased by the plaintiffs were embodied in in-
struments, very possibly plaintiffs were investors with respect to those instruments.
Conversely, the supposed legal rights obtained by Avco were embodied in instruments,
the plaintiffs' notes. Avco was therefore the "investor" vis-i-vis those notes, yet the
court viewed the "investment" as being made by the note issuers.
Ingenito involved a similar factual situation. As in Davis, the Ingenito court
focused on the wrong parties as investors, concluding that the notes of a large group
of unsophisticated individuals were securities. 376 F. Supp. at 1180.
79. E.g., C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354,
1359-60 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d
546, 551 (10th Cir. 1974); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 695 (3d Cir.
1973); Thorp Commercial Corp. v. Northgate Indus., Inc., [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ir 94,929, at 97,211 (D. Minn. 1974); cf. McClure
v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975);
United States v. Koenig, 388 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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use. Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc.80 is a good illustration. Plain-
tiffs received lifetime membership in the defendant health club in return for
their notes for $360, payable in twenty-four monthly installments. The
court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the notes they had given were
securities and within the coverage of rule lOb-5,8 1 holding that under the
facts presented these promissory notes were not securities.
Focusing on the recipients rather than the issuers of securities, courts
frequently have stated that for notes to be securities they must be dis-
tributed in a public, not a private, transaction.8 2 By public distribution
courts generally have meant that the notes were acquired by a large num-
ber of recipients or that an unsophisticated person was the purchaser, or
that both factors were present. In Davis v. Avco Corp.8 3 there were many
victims of the fraudulent scheme; the court stated :84
The complaint indicates that plaintiff and the members of the class
he represents were a group of unsophisticated investors who probably
did not understand the potential (and likely) risks to the money they
were investing . . . . Here were unsophisticated investors, with little
knowledge or understanding of the likely risks their investment
faced . . . . It appears that these are the very kinds of transactions
which Congress intended to sweep under the umbrella of the anti-
fraud provisions of the securities laws ...
For these reasons this Court holds that, based on the allegations
in the complaint, these promissory notes constitute securities within the
meaning of 15 U.S.C., §§ 77b(1) and 78c(a)(10).
When large numbers of recipients are involved, a major concern is
the widespread public harm that may be caused. It has even been stated
that a serious threat of public harm is created when a large number of
shareholders may be adversely affected by a fraud perpetrated against a
single corporate note payee. Thus, in Crowell v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie
Railroad8 5 the court held that notes issued by a parent to a subsidiary
corporation with a significant public ownership were securities.8 6 Pur-
chasers of instruments who are not familiar with the issuer's business,
given their limited access to accurate, detailed information about the issuer,
are particularly susceptible to misrepresentation. Thus, the protection of
the prophylactic and remedial measures of the federal securities Acts is
warranted. Even single members of the public have been held to merit this
protection so long as they are unsophisticated.87 And the lack of sophisti-
80. 336 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
81. See note 5 supra.
82. E.g., SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 526-27 (5th Cir.
1974); Barthe v. Rizzo, 384 F. Supp. 1063, 1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See also Coffey,
supra note 4, at 371.
83. 371 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ohio 1974), discussed in note 78 supra.
84. Id. at 787-88.
85. 373 F. Supp. 1303 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
86. Id. at 1308.
87. See Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546, 551 (10th Cir. 1974); cf. Barthe v.
Rizzo, 384 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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cation requirement does not exclude from protection large, experienced
investors if they are unfamiliar with the particular issuer's business.88
The third Howey criterion, expectation of a profit, has been discussed
infrequently by the courts. Two cases, however, have rested their hold-
ings that the instruments involved were not securities in part on the absence
of a profit-motive. The Supreme Court held in United Housing Foundation
that the instruments involved were neither stocks, investment contracts,
nor any other type of security, in part because the plaintiffs had not ac-
quired the shares for the purpose of making a profit.8 9 The considerable
emphasis afforded the absence of a profit motive in United Housing Foun-
dation may indicate the Court's judgment that an expectation or intention
of realizing a profit is a necessary element of any security. 90 In Rosen
88. See Stier v. Smith, 473 F.2d 1205, 1207 (5th Cir. 1973) ("[S]ophisticated
investors, like all others, are entitled to the truth."); Barthe v. Rizzo, 384 F. Supp.
1063, 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Welch Foods, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., [1974-1975
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REp. J 94,806, at 96,685 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). In
Welch Foods, Welch, the purchaser of Penn Central notes, had considerable sophistica-
tion and knowledge in the commercial world. However, it was familiar neither with
the operation of Penn Central nor with the railroad industry in general, and the court
therefore permitted it to sue under the federal securities Acts.
Banks and other lending institutions, on the other hand, are frequently, if not
always, excluded as investors under the securities Acts. See, e.g., Great Western Bank
& Trust v. Kotz, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. i" 95,494, at 99,502-04 (9th Cir., Mar. 22,
1976) (Wright, J., concurring) ; C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc.,
508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975) ; McClure v. First Nat'l
Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975); Bellah v.
First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974) ; Avenue State Bank v. Tourtelot, 379
F. Supp. 250 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Thorp Commercial Corp. v. Northgate Indus., Inc.,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,929 (D. Minn. 1974). The
reason may be that banks are usually the single payees on notes given in loan trans-
actions and they are sophisticated agents in the lending field. While they may not be
familiar with the borrower's particular business, they probably do have the expertise to
make a reasonable forecast of the likelihood of success of that business, and in any
event would take sufficient collateral so as to minimize the risk of loss. See note
68 supra.
89. 421 U.S. at 859-60.
90. The United Housing Foundation Court based its conclusion that the coopera-
tive housing shares at issue were not securities largely on the absence of a profit
motive. Rejecting the contention that the shares were "stocks," and therefore securi-
ties within the Acts, the Court stated that they lacked "the most common feature
of stock: the right to receive 'dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits,' "
421 U.S. at 851, and that "the inducement to purchase was solely to acquire subsidized
low-cost living space; it was not to invest for profit." Id. Later, in applying the Howey
test to hold that the shares were not investment contracts, the Court observed that
[iln the present case there can be no doubt that investors were attracted solely by
the prospect of acquiring a place to live, and not by financial returns on their
investments. . . . In short, neither of the kinds of profits traditionally associated
with securities was offered to respondents.
Id. at 853-54. And in concluding its opinion, the Court stated:
[w]hat distinguishes a security transaction - and what is absent here - is at
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v. Dick"' the promissory note of an individual was accepted in settlement
of potential claims against him for his fraudulent acts. Because these
sums functioned as restitution for injury rather than as profit on an
investment, the note was held not to be a security. 92
Profits generally take one of two forms - income or capital apprecia-
tion.93 With equity instruments such as common stock, income normally
is earned by the corporation and then distributed to the shareholders as
dividends.9 4 With debt securities such as notes, however, income usually
takes the form of interest paid regardless of whether the business has
profited. Although a note payee most frequently intends to earn profits
in the form of interest, a note conceivably could be drafted so that the payee
would earn profits by participation in the earnings of the enterprise. This
arrangement would seem also to satisfy the profits requirements.
Where a note does not expressly recite that the payee either will be
paid interest or will participate in the earnings of the business, courts should
scrutinize closely the motive of the purchaser. The payee may well have
taken the note for some reason other than to earn profits, for example, the
loan might have been motivated purely by social or personal reasons or
perhaps taken as payment for goods.95 In such cases, the note should not
be deemed a security. On the other hand, a non-interest bearing note may
have been 'purchased for the purpose of realizing capital appreciation. In
SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., discussed earlier, 96 the corpora-
tion returned sixty percent of the funds deposited with it by its clients.
investment where one parts with his money in the hope of receiving profits from
the efforts of others....
Id. at 858.
91. [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 94,786 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
92. Id. at 96,605. The fact that the issuer was not a business or governmental
entity also may have contributed to the court's decision. See notes 76-81 and accom-
panying text supra.
93. SAUVAIN, supra note 15, at 8. The Supreme Court used a slightly different
formulation when discussing investment contracts in United Housing Foundation,
describing the two kinds of profits as "capital appreciation resulting from the develop-
ment of the initial investment" and "a participation in earnings resulting from the use
of investors' funds." 421 U.S. at 852.
94. This is commonly referred to as participation in the earnings of the enterprise.
95. See Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 695 (3d Cir. 1973). In Lino
the plaintiff was an individual who gave his note to a corporation in payment for a
franchise interest. The Third Circuit felt that it was illogical to describe plaintiff's
note as having been "purchased" through payment to him of the right to operate the
franchise. Id. For that reason, the court held that the note was not a security. This
is an expedient means of eliminating from the definitional sections of the Acts any
notes which are given in payment for property, services, or rights, where it is clear
that the recipient has no interest in investing in the issuer's business and has accepted
a note only because a more desirable form of payment, e.g., cash, is unavailable. This
theory may also explain the holdings in Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611
(7th Cir. 1973), and Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 307 (E.D.
Mo. 1971).
96. See notes 59-62 and accompanying text supra.
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The notes issued for the remaining forty percent were no doubt worth
substantially less than their face amounts. The depositors "paid" for these
notes by promising to refrain from suing to force liquidation. Apparently,
a profit motive was involved: by foregoing a small recovery at the time the
notes were issued, the recipient hoped eventually to recover the full amount.
Although not analyzing this point, the court upheld jurisdiction over the
transaction as one involving securities.
The final element in the Howey test is that the investor rely on the
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others. In Howey, this criterion
was expressed as "solely from the efforts of others." 7 In SEC v. Glenn
W. Turner Enterprises," however, the Ninth Circuit held that
the word "solely" should not be read as a strict or literal limitation on
the definition of an investment contract, but rather must be construed
realistically, so as to include within the definition those schemes which
involve in substance, if not form, securities.
Thus, contracts whereby plaintiffs paid for the right to attend Dare To Be
Great99 classes and the opportunity to recruit others to the scheme were
held to be investment contracts within the securities Acts despite the fact
that to a significant extent profits would derive from plaintiffs' own efforts.
In United Housing Foundation the Court took note of the Ninth Circuit's
position, but expressed no view on the issue.100 Nonetheless, the Court
adopted the terminology "derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial
efforts of others,"10' indicating some retrenchment. Thus, lower level em-
ployees of a corporation who purchase stock in their employer, while
apparently being excluded from the protection of the Acts by the Howey
formulation, would appear to be protected under the United Housing
Foundation reformulation. This liberal approach seems appropriate when
viewed in light of the few decisions which have held note transactions to
be outside of the Acts because of participation in the affairs of the enter-
prise; in all such cases involvement at the managerial and entrepreneurial
levels has been substantial. Thus, the Seventh Circuit, in C.N.S. Enter-
prises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc.,102 in listing the facts that caused
it to hold that the notes were not securities, mentioned that "[tlhe business
enterprise involved was to be operated by the plaintiffs [the issuers], not
by the bank or by the defendants."103 And in Oxford Finance Cos. v.
Harvey'0 4 the court pointedly discussed the problem of participation by
the note payee, concluding that since the note payee was a partner in a
97. 328 U.S. at 301.
98. 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
99. See note 78 supra.
100. 421 U.S. at 852 n.16.
101. Id. at 852.
102. 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1975).
103. Id. at 1363.
104. 385 F. Supp. 431 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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joint venture in which managerial decisions were approved by both parties,
the note could not properly be characterized as an investment.
Recently, the Ninth Circuit, in Great Western Bank & Trust v.
Kotz,105 held that an unsecured promissory note given to a bank in ex-
change for a $1,500,000 line of credit was not a security, because of
significant control exercised by the bank. 106 The bank, by virtue of its
superior bargaining position, was able to restrict the uses to which de-
fendant could put his capital, to require defendant to maintain a $300,000
checking account with the bank during the period of the loan, to require
defendant to maintain minimum consolidated working capital of $4,000,000
and a net current position of at least $500,000, to prohibit future unsecured
borrowing by defendant without the bank's consent, to limit major changes
in defendant's corporate structure, and to require the defendant to submit
to inspections by the bank.10 7 The court explained that the corporate note
issuer could do little without answering to the bank and therefore recovery
of the note principal and interest did not depend primarily on the man-
agerial efforts of others.1 0 8 It thus appears that to meet the requirement
that an investor not be exercising managerial control, the investor must
leave routine matters and policy decisions solely to the note issuer.
CONCLUSION
For many years there has been confusion and inconsistency within
the federal courts in their efforts to determine what types of notes are to
be included as securities under the definitional sections of the 1933 and
1934 Acts. Early decisions construed the phrase "any note" literally,
making any common law note a security. Federal courts later realized
that not all common law notes should be considered securities under the
Acts, but these courts weeded out those notes which were not "note securi-
ties" on an erroneous basis, construing the phrase "unless the context
otherwise requires" to mean context of the transaction. This Comment
has urged adoption of a more proper construction of that phrase, to mean
context of the statute. Construction of the term "note" then should be
undertaken in light of both the economic realities of the transaction at
issue and the legislative purpose of the Acts, and only those instruments
that are within the ordinary concept of a security should receive the pro-
tection of the Acts. The elements of a security suggested by the Supreme
Court in Howey and recently applied in United Housing Foundation offer
an analytical framework and useful standards for assessing disputed note
transactions. General use of this test should significantly advance the
difficult process of defining the term "note" as used in the securities Acts.
105. CCH FEn. SEc. L. REP. 95,494 (9th Cir., Mar. 22, 1976).
106. The bank was relying on future earnings of the corporate note issuer for
recovery of the principal and interest. Id. at 99,497.
107. Id. at 99,498.
108. Id. at 99,502.
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